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Abstract 
 What counts as hypocrisy? Current theorizing emphasizes that people see hypocrisy 
when an individual sends them “false signals” about his or her morality (Jordan, Sommers, 
Bloom, & Rand, 2017); indeed, the canonical hypocrite acts more virtuously in public than in 
private. An alternative theory posits that people see hypocrisy when an individual enjoys 
“undeserved moral benefits,” such as feeling more virtuous than his or her behavior merits, even 
when the individual has not sent false signals to others (Effron, O’Connor, Leroy, & Lucas, 
2018). This theory predicts that acting less virtuously in public than in private can seem 
hypocritical by indicating that individuals have used good deeds to feel less guilty about their 
public sins than they should. Seven experiments (N = 3,468 representing 64 nationalities) 
supported this prediction. Participants read about a worker in a “sin industry” who secretly 
performed good deeds. When the individual’s public work (e.g., selling tobacco) was 
inconsistent with, versus unrelated to, the good deeds (e.g., anonymous donations to an anti-
smoking cause vs. an anti-obesity cause), participants perceived him as more hypocritical, which 
in turn predicted less praise for his good deeds. Participants also inferred that the individual was 
using the inconsistent good deeds to cleanse his conscience for his public work, and such moral 
cleansing appeared hypocritical when it successfully alleviated his guilt. These results broaden 
and deepen understanding about how lay people conceptualize hypocrisy. Hypocrisy does not 
require appearing more virtuous than you are; it suffices to feel more virtuous than you deserve. 
(250 words) 
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Moral Cleansing as Hypocrisy: 
When Private Acts of Charity Make You Feel Better Than You Deserve 
In 2015, hackers released the names of people with paid accounts at Ashley Madison, a 
website designed to facilitate extramarital affairs. Among the names was Josh Duggar, a family-
values activist and the executive director of the Family Research Council, a lobbying group that 
aims “to champion marriage and family as the foundation of civilization, the seedbed of virtue, 
and the wellspring of society” (Feinberg, 2015). Given that Duggar appeared to be cultivating a 
public image that was more virtuous than his private behavior, it is no surprise that many 
accused him of hypocrisy (Puente, 2015). Now consider the founding CEO of Ashely Madison, 
Noel Biderman. Though Biderman publicly promotes marital infidelity, he has admitted to 
practicing marital fidelity in his private life (Walker, 2015). Would people condemn Biderman as 
a hypocrite if they knew he was faithful to his wife? Perhaps not, because his failure to practice 
what he preaches does not involve cultivating the false appearance of virtue. However, we will 
argue that people still see hypocrisy in Biderman’s behavior. By investigating how publicly 
promoting vice while privately practicing virtue affects lay people’s judgments of hypocrisy—
and the consequences of these judgments for how much they praise the virtue—the present 
research advances theory about “what counts” as hypocrisy. 
Understanding how people think about hypocrisy is important because individuals and 
organizations suffer severe consequences when they are perceived as hypocritical. Individuals 
incur greater moral condemnation, punitive sentiment, and other forms of censure for the same 
wrongdoing when audiences perceive it as hypocritical versus merely wrong (Effron, Markus, 
Jackman, Muramoto, & Muluk, 2018; Kreps, Laurin, & Merritt, 2017; Laurent, Clark, Walker, & 
Wiseman, 2014; Powell & Smith, 2013). Scandals involving hypocrisy will damage a 
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politician’s reputation more severely than equivalent scandals without hypocrisy (Bhatti, Hansen, 
& Olsen, 2013). In a laboratory study, job applicants who had committed a minor transgression 
were less likely to be selected for a job and more likely to be offered a lower wage when the 
transgression seemed hypocritical than when it did not (Effron, Lucas, & O’Connor, 2015). 
When leaders and teams in organizations fail to enact the values they preach, employee 
performance can suffer and employment turnover can increase (Greenbaum, Mawritz, & Piccolo, 
2015; Palanski & Yammarino, 2011; Simons, Friedman, Liu, & McLean Parks, 2007). When 
organizations themselves seem hypocritical, their reputations and stock prices can take a hit 
(Janney & Gove, 2011; Stoll, 2002; Wagner, Lutz, & Weitz, 2009).  
Examples like these illustrate that hypocrisy often involves inconsistency between a 
person’s public image and private behavior. Several theories suggest that inconsistency only 
counts as hypocrisy when the person appears more virtuous in public than in private (Graham, 
Meindl, Koleva, Iyer, & Johnson, 2015; Jordan, Sommers, Bloom, & Rand, 2017; Monin & 
Merritt, 2012; Stone & Fernandez, 2008). In this view, people hate hypocrites for trying to trick 
them with a “false signal” of virtue (Jordan et al., 2017, p. 356). However, by focusing on 
inconsistencies between public virtues and private transgressions, the literature’s dominant 
perspectives on hypocrisy offer an incomplete and overly narrow understanding of how 
laypeople think about hypocrisy. Challenging these theories, we propose that a public image that 
is less virtuous than private behavior also counts as hypocrisy in laypeople’s minds. We argue 
that what bothers people in such cases is not that a person appears more virtuous than she is, but 
that she feels more virtuous than she deserves.  
To illustrate how inconsistency between a public image and private behavior could seem 
hypocritical, consider two tobacco executives who privately and anonymously donate to different 
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causes: The first executive funds the fight against smoking and the second funds the fight against 
obesity. We posit that the first executive is more likely to be judged as a hypocrite, and will thus 
receive less praise for her donation, than the second executive. Our reasoning is that, compared 
to the anti-obesity donation, the anti-smoking donation is more easily seen as an attempt to 
alleviate guilt for promoting tobacco use – a case of “moral cleansing” (Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, 
Green, & Lerner, 2000). As we develop below, laypeople may consider such moral cleansing as 
hypocritical because they perceive it to allow an individual to feel more virtuous than she 
deserves. 
The following sections review theories of hypocrisy and their limitations, develop our 
hypotheses, and present seven experiments and a meta-analysis of their results. 
Theories of How Laypeople Judge Hypocrisy 
Hypocrisy and inconsistency. Current theories offer limited consensus on “what counts” 
as hypocrisy to laypeople. One perspective, grounded in cognitive dissonance theory (Aronson, 
1968; Festinger, 1957), is that people’s aversion to hypocrisy simply reflects their general dislike 
of inconsistency (Tedeschi, Schlenker, & Bonoma, 1971). A similar perspective has been 
influential in the organizational-behavior literature (see Simons et al., 2015, for a review), where 
a foundational paper conceptualized hypocrisy as “inconsistency between talk and action” 
(Simons, 2002, p. 20; see also Greenbaum et al., 2015). In this view, hypocrisy “does not 
consider the morality of principles, but rather focuses on the extent to which stated principles are 
seen as aligning with actions” (Simons, 2002, p. 19). 
 More recent research, however, has revealed that a simple aversion to inconsistency 
cannot adequately account for lay judgments of hypocrisy (Alicke, Gordon, & Rose, 2013; 
Effron, O’Connor, Leroy, & Lucas, 2018; Hale & Pillow, 2015). For example, “saying one thing 
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then doing another” seems more hypocritical than “doing one thing than saying another” 
(Barden, Rucker, & Petty, 2005; Barden, Rucker, Petty, & Rios, 2014). That is, the same degree 
of inconsistency between practicing and preaching seems less hypocritical when the practicing 
precedes the preaching, because people attribute the inconsistency to “turning over a new leaf.” 
Relatedly, advising others to “do as I say, not as I’ve done” seems less hypocritical when the 
advisor has suffered for what she has done, because suffering made the advisor’s preaching seem 
more genuine (Effron & Miller, 2015). Even normative perspectives do not label all 
inconsistencies as hypocrisy. For example, some studies operationalized hypocrisy as holding the 
self to lower moral standards than others (Lammers, 2012; Lammers, Stapel, & Galinsky, 2010; 
Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2007, 2008), but labeled behavior as hyper-critical when holding the self 
to higher moral standards than others (Lammers et al., 2010). Going further, in some cases 
inconsistency between words and deeds can even have positive interpersonal consequences for 
the actor (Effron & Monin, 2010), such as favorable impression management (Lönnqvist, 
Irlenbusch, & Walkowitz, 2014).  
Based on these and other findings, a recent review concluded that to condemn actions as 
hypocritical, observers not only need to detect inconsistency, but also must make a morally 
discrediting attribution about why the inconsistency occurred (Effron, O’Connor, et al., 2018). In 
other words, the evidence indicates that hypocrisy is an interpretation of inconsistent behaviors’ 
meaning, not merely a perception that behaviors are inconsistent. However, current theories 
disagree about what kind of discrediting attributions hypocrisy involves. We review these 
theories next and highlight a key tension in the literature that we aim to address with the present 
research. 
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Hypocrisy as false signaling. One theory holds that people who practice the same 
behavior they condemn in others are hypocritical “because they use their condemnation to 
mislead other people about their moral behavior” (Jordan et al., 2017, p. 387). In other words, 
preaching virtue sends others a “false signal” that one will act virtuously oneself (Jordan et al., 
2017). In support of this perspective, online participants rated a target person more negatively for 
downloading illegal music if she had previously condemned illegal downloading than if she had 
not – unless she also admitted to this behavior at the time she condemned it. By admitting to the 
less-virtuous behavior she condemned, the target clarified that she did not intend her 
condemnation to signal her virtue. Directly condemning a behavior is not the only way of falsely 
signaling one’s virtue. Working for an organization that promotes a virtuous cause (e.g., safe 
driving), and then acting inconsistently with that cause (e.g., driving recklessly) seems 
hypocritical because people interpret the work as a false signal that one values the cause (Effron 
et al., 2015). 
The false-signaling theory of hypocrisy comports with a normative argument made by 
other scholars: that inconsistency should only be considered hypocrisy if it involves the “false 
appearance of virtue” (Monin & Merritt, 2012, p. 171). Researchers’ decisions about how to 
operationalize hypocritical behavior reflect this sort of normative definition (Graham et al., 
2015). For example, participants in one series of studies chose to flip a coin as a fair way of 
determining who would complete a desirable task (versus a tedious task), but then lied about the 
coin’s outcome to ensure they would get to do this task (Batson, Kobrynowicz, Dinnerstein, 
Kampf, & Wilson, 1997; Batson, Thompson, & Chen, 2002; Batson, Thompson, Seuferling, 
Whitney, & Strongman, 1999). Batson and colleagues labelled this behavior hypocritical because 
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it suggests participants wanted to appear moral without being moral (Batson et al., 1999; see also 
Batson, 2002).  
The idea that hypocrisy requires falsely signaling virtue fits well with the etymology of 
the term itself, from the Greek hypokrisia, meaning “to play a part on the stage” (Alicke et al., 
2013; Crisp & Cowton, 1994). Akin to Goffman’s (1959) metaphor of the self as a theater, 
hypocrites seem to be those who present themselves publicly at the “front stage” in ways that 
appear more virtuous than they are privately at the “back stage.” In other words, this perspective 
paints hypocrisy as a “moral masquerade” (Batson et al., 1997, p. 1336) occurring “through an 
act of moral self-presentation” to others (Stone, Wiegand, Cooper, & Aronson, 1997, p. 54). 
To summarize, the false-signaling theory posits that inconsistency becomes hypocritical 
when people’s public behavior disingenuously signals their virtue to an audience of other people. 
This perspective fits with the term’s etymology, with normative arguments about what should 
count as hypocrisy, and with existing data on what lay people think does count as hypocrisy. 
However, the false-signaling perspective does not share our prediction that people see hypocrisy 
in the inconsistency between public vice and private virtue, because such inconsistency does not 
signal a virtuous image to others. In the next section, we review another theory that does share 
our prediction and offers a broader perspective on hypocrisy than the false-signaling perspective.  
Hypocrisy as claiming undeserved moral benefits. An alternative theoretical 
perspective is that people will interpret an actor’s inconsistency as hypocrisy if they believe the 
actor has “claimed an undeserved moral benefit,” defined as a social or psychological reward for 
virtuous behavior (Effron, O'Connor et al., 2018, p. 65). Because people are motivated to uphold 
norms of equity (Walster, Walster, & Berscheid, 1978), to believe in a just world (Lerner, 1980; 
Lerner & Miller, 1978; Ross & Miller, 2002), and to punish free-riders (Fehr & Gächter, 2002; 
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Jordan, Hoffman, Bloom, & Rand, 2016), it makes sense that they would morally condemn 
someone for taking a benefit to which he or she is not entitled.  
Appearing more virtuous to others than one really is represents one example of an 
undeserved moral benefit. Appearing virtuous can satisfy people’s psychological need to be 
respected, trusted, and positively regarded, and can also lead to tangible rewards (Axelrod & 
Hamilton, 1981; Frank, 1988). In this respect, the undeserved-benefits perspective encompasses 
the false-signaling perspective: Falsely signaling virtue is one way of claiming an undeserved 
moral benefit.  
At the same time, the undeserved-benefits perspective is broader than the false-signaling 
perspective because appearing virtuous is not the only moral benefit that a person could claim. 
Other moral benefits include the right to judge or influence others’ moral behavior (Effron & 
Miller, 2015), and – most germane to the present investigation – feeling virtuous (Effron, 
O’Connor, et al., 2018). Because morality is a core part of many people’s self-concept (Aquino 
& Reed, 2002; Steele, 1988), people are willing to make substantial sacrifices to feel virtuous 
(Andreoni, 1988, 1990; Batson et al., 1989, 1988). For example, they will make anonymous 
donations to feel generous (Hugh-Jones & Reinstein, 2012; Karlan & List, 2007), or forgo 
lucrative cheating opportunities to avoid feeling like a cheater (Abeler, Nosenzo, & Raymond, 
2019; Bryan, Adams, & Monin, 2013; Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008; Shalvi, Dana, Handgraaf, & 
De Dreu, 2011). In short, feeling virtuous is a valuable resource that normally must be earned 
through costly or effortful behavior.  
Just as appearing more virtuous to others than one deserves is perceived as hypocritical, 
we propose that feeling more virtuous than one deserves is also perceived as hypocritical. Past 
research suggests that observers may readily perceive that others’ feelings of virtue are unearned. 
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For instance, cynicism about the motives and self-interest of others (Kruger & Gilovich, 1999; 
Newman & Cain, 2014; Ratner & Miller, 2001) may lead observers to suspect that a target is 
motivated to wring the most virtuous feeling out of the smallest good deed, particularly when 
that target’s transgressions are salient (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006), as is the case in our 
empirical context. Further, people are less likely to perceive others’ behavior, compared to their 
own behavior, as earning the right to feel virtuous (Effron, 2014; Kruger & Gilovich, 2004). 
Anticipating that an actor is likely to judge her own good deeds against relatively lax standards, 
observers may be on the lookout for actors who try to get away with feeling virtuous despite not 
earning these feelings. Observers would condemn these actors as hypocrites, according to the 
undeserved-benefits perspective.  
One situation in which observers may suspect that an actor is trying to feel undeservedly 
virtuous is when the good deeds she does in private directly contradict her public vices. In such 
situations, compared to those in which the good deeds are unrelated to the vices, observers 
should be more likely to construe the good deeds as an attempt to ease the actor’s conscience by 
compensating for the public vices. Observers may construe these goods deeds as “molehills of 
virtue” but anticipate that the actor interprets them as “mountains of morality” (Effron, 2014). 
Observers may thus condemn the actor as a hypocrite because they believe she feels more 
virtuous than she deserves. 
For example, consider again the founder of the Ashley Madison website, who publicly 
encourages marital infidelity but privately stays faithful to his wife. Audiences could impute that 
he believes his own fidelity compensates for the infidelity he has facilitated for his website’s 54 
million subscribers, and that he should feel guiltier than he does (May, 2018). Or consider again 
the tobacco executive who secretly and anonymously donates to fund smoking-cessation 
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programs. Audiences could infer that her donation alleviates her guilt for selling cigarettes. 
Although her work harms millions of smokers, with relatively minimal effort she has allowed 
herself to sleep well at night. More broadly, people may interpret private good deeds as 
hypocrisy if they seem like an attempt to purchase a clean conscience on the cheap – in other 
words, to claim a moral benefit that one does not deserve. 
Prior research has documented numerous examples of moral behavior motivated by a 
desire to reduce guilt (Carlsmith & Gross, 1969; Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007; Xu, 
Bègue, & Shankland, 2011). For example, recalling or imagining bad deeds may motivate people 
to bolster their self-image by making more-virtuous choices (Jordan, Mullen, & Murnighan, 
2011; Sachdeva, Iliev, & Medin, 2009; Zhong et al., 2010). Such moral cleansing – which 
occurs when “people counterbalance their bad deeds by behaving in ways that symbolically 
reaffirm the values that had been undermined” (Gollwitzer & Melzer, 2012, p. 1356) – may help 
individuals feel more virtuous following ethical lapses (Jordan et al., 2011; Lee & Schwarz, 
2011; Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006; Zhong, Liljenquist, & Cain, 2009). Advancing this prior 
research, we propose that moral cleansing can also make a person vulnerable to accusations of 
hypocrisy. 
Hypotheses  
 To summarize, both the false-signaling and the undeserved-benefit theories can account 
for prior work on lay judgments of hypocrisy. In these situations, because of its inconsistency 
with private vices, public behavior sends a false signal of virtue to an audience of other people. 
The signal represents a claim to a moral benefit (the appearance of virtue), and the signal’s 
falsity makes the benefit undeserved. To distinguish between these two theories, we examine 
how people judge actors whose public behavior (e.g., promoting tobacco use) is inconsistent with 
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private virtues (e.g., secret, anonymous donations to anti-tobacco causes). Here, the public 
behavior does not signal virtue to an audience of other people (if anything, it signals the 
opposite). However, the public behavior could imply that the actors are claiming an undeserved 
moral benefit: feeling more virtuous than their behavior merits. Thus, if people condemn 
inconsistency as hypocrisy when private virtue follows public vice, it would support the 
undeserved-benefits theory and suggest that the false-signaling theory cannot account for the full 
range of lay beliefs about hypocrisy. 
 The main goal of our research was to test whether and why people would view 
inconsistency as hypocritical even when it involved public vice and private virtue. Following the 
undeserved-benefits theory, we hypothesized that inconsistency between private virtues and 
public behavior increases ascriptions of hypocrisy. The undeserved-benefits theory also specifies 
the mechanism explaining why people would view inconsistency between public vices and 
private virtues as hypocritical: They view the private virtues as moral cleansing that has the 
potential to make the hypocrite feel less guilty about the vices than he or she deserves. 
A second goal was to refine the undeserved-benefits theory by exploring whether 
hypocrisy, in lay people’s minds, requires obtaining an undeserved moral benefit, or merely 
attempting to obtain such a benefit. In other words, we explore the roles of intentions (Knobe, 
2003; Malle & Knobe, 1997) versus outcomes (Alicke, 2008; Cushman, 2008; Mazzocco, 
Alicke, & Davis, 2004) of guilt-reduction in hypocrisy judgments. The undeserved-benefits 
theory is clear that actually feeling more virtuous than you deserve is hypocritical, as in the case 
of the tobacco executive whose work harms millions of smokers but whose conscience feels 
clean after donating to an anti-tobacco cause. The theory is not clear about whether merely trying 
to feel more virtuous than you deserve is hypocritical, as in the case of a tobacco executive who 
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unsuccessfully attempts to alleviate her guilt with an anti-tobacco donation. On one hand, to the 
extent that attempting to alleviate guilt seems like a claim to an undeserved moral benefit, it 
would seem hypocritical. On the other hand, guilty feelings could be a positive signal of moral 
character (Barasch, Levine, Berman, & Small, 2014) and only seem hypocritical if successfully 
alleviated. Without formalizing hypotheses, we explored whether successful moral cleansing is 
necessary to evoke hypocrisy or whether attempted moral cleansing is sufficient.   
 Our studies also measured a potential downstream consequence of hypocrisy judgments: 
moral praise. As noted, previous research shows that private transgressions receive greater moral 
condemnation when they are perceived as hypocritical (Effron, Markus, et al., 2018). By 
analogy, private virtues should receive less moral praise when they are perceived as hypocritical. 
Several of our studies tested whether hypocrisy ascriptions would mediate a negative indirect 
effect of inconsistency on praise. 
Testing these hypotheses goes beyond normative debates about what should count as 
hypocrisy (Crisp & Cowton, 1994; Graham et al., 2015; Monin & Merritt, 2012; Simons, 2002; 
Szabados & Soifer, 2004) and contributes a new perspective to research on how people actually 
judge what counts as hypocrisy (Alicke et al., 2013; Effron et al., 2015; Effron & Miller, 2015; 
Effron, O’Connor, et al., 2018; Jordan et al., 2017; Kreps et al., 2017). By testing whether 
inconsistency between public vices and private virtues seems hypocritical to laypeople, we aim 
to demonstrate that people perceive hypocrisy in a broader array of circumstances than 
previously appreciated, which helps disentangle different theoretical perspectives. The 
undeserved-benefits and the false-signaling theories agree that appearing more virtuous than you 
are can trigger hypocrisy ascriptions, but only the undeserved-benefits perspective asserts that 
false appearances are not necessary; feeling more virtuous than you deserve is sufficient. 
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The Present Research 
We present seven experiments testing our hypotheses. Study 1 – based on the earlier 
Ashley Madison example – examined whether participants would judge the founder of a website 
promoting extra-marital affairs as more hypocritical when they knew (vs. were unaware) that he 
was faithful to his own spouse. Study 2 tested the same prediction in a new scenario with a more 
tightly-controlled manipulation. That is, the target person in Study 2 always enacted private good 
deeds, but we manipulated whether the good deeds were inconsistent with vs. unrelated to his 
public behavior in his work role. To ensure generalizability and robustness, Study 3 recruited 
participants from more than 60 different nationalities to consider 20 different contexts where 
hypocrisy might occur. Study 4 provided a first test of the moral-cleansing mechanism in a 
measurement-of-mediation design. Two supplemental studies reported in the Online Supplement 
replicated our previous findings and tested robustness with minor modifications to the procedure. 
Study 5 manipulated the hypothesized moral-cleansing mechanism directly, and also explored 
whether successful moral-cleansing would be necessary for people to perceive hypocrisy in 
private virtue, or whether attempted (but unsuccessful) moral cleansing would suffice. Finally, to 
more precisely estimate our effects’ size and reliability, we meta-analyzed our studies. Several 
studies included a measure of praise for the virtuous behavior, because lowered praise could be a 
downstream consequences of hypocrisy judgments. 
Open Practices  
We report all conditions, measures, and data exclusions, and we have posted verbatim 
study materials in the Online Supplement. Stopping rules for data collection were determined in 
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advance, and Studies 3 and 5 were pre-registered. Study data1 and analysis code can be found at 
https://osf.io/uce7n/?view_only=10d4262c8b144f8b93981c6860da16a0. 
Study 1: Monogamous CEO Encourages Others to Cheat 
Method 
 Participants. Four hundred-one participants signed up for a “Current Events and News 
Survey” (Mage = 37.25 years, SD = 12.25; 213 men, 188 women, 2 no response) on Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk; Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Horton, Rand, & Zeckhauser, 
2011; Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010). Each participant received $.55.  We promoted data 
quality by allowing participants to begin the study only if they correctly answered a reading 
comprehension question. By a priori decision, we retained only those participants who spent 
between 4 and 25 minutes completing the study (n = 337) and responded correctly to attention-
checks described below. Our analyses are based on the remaining 310 participants. The direction 
and significance of results were the same when we retained all participants for analysis. 
Materials. We wrote and realistically formatted a brief article based on actual reports 
about Noel Biderman, the founder and CEO of Ashely Madison, a website that connects people 
seeking extra-marital affairs (the Online Supplement contains the article’s full text). At the time 
of the study, the website had been in the news for being hacked. Participants read different 
versions of the article depending on randomly assigned condition. 
Manipulation. Participants in the inconsistent-virtue condition read factual information 
that Biderman promoted adultery in a published book entitled “Cheaters Prosper” and other 
public statements (“Life is short. Have an affair”), but that investigative reporting discovered he 
 
1 The research ethics boards that approved Study 3 withheld permission to post even anonymized data publicly, 
because the consent forms did not inform participants that their data would be used in this way. However, data from 
that study are available upon request. 
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had privately remained faithful to his wife.2 Participants in the no-virtue condition only read that 
he promoted adultery. Thus, only in the inconsistent-virtue condition did he enact private virtue 
that directly contradicted his less-than-virtuous public image. Note that these conditions provide 
a particularly strong test of our hypotheses. That is, we expected participants to rate Biderman as 
more hypocritical in the inconsistent-virtue condition even though this condition provides more 
positive information about him (i.e., his marital fidelity). 
Hypocrisy measure.  Participants reported how much they thought the founder, 
Biderman, was a hypocrite on an established five-item hypocrisy measure (Effron et al., 2015): 
how hypocritical, two-faced, phony, genuine (reverse-coded), and insincere they found him (α = 
.90; 1 = Disagree Strongly; 7 = Agree Strongly). (Because some studies use a single-item 
measure of hypocrisy – e.g., Effron & Monin, 2010 – we reran the analyses in all studies using 
only the single item about whether the target person was a hypocrite. All results remained 
significant and in the same direction). 
Praise measure. Participants indicated how positively they viewed the founder and his 
behavior using a 13-item scale adapted from previous research about hypocrisy ( = .90; Effron 
et al., 2015; Effron & Monin, 2010).3 Nine of these items measured the founder’s character on 7-
point bipolar scales (starred items were reversed-coded): cruel-kind, nice-awful*, cold-warm, 
honest-dishonest*, unfair-fair, moral-immoral*, arrogant-humble, good-bad*, likable-
dislikable*; three of the items assessed condemnation of the founder’s leadership behavior at the 
company (“Noel Biderman should be punished harshly”; “As CEO of Ashley Madison when the 
 
2 The article emphasized actual accounts of his monogamy with several additional fictional quotes, such as “There is 
no way I would ever cheat.” 
3 This previous research used the measure to assess moral condemnation of transgressions, where higher numbers 
indicated more negative evaluations. To better capture our interest in praise for virtuous behavior, we reverse-coded 
the measure so higher numbers indicate more positive evaluations. 
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hacks occurred, Noel Biderman should be held responsible”; “Noel Biderman should be sued for 
any impending damages or liability”; 1 = Disagree Strongly, 7 = Agree Strongly, all reverse-
coded); for the last item, participants reported how much they agreed or disagreed on a 7-point 
scale with the statement, “If Noel Biderman were looking for another job, organizations 
definitely should not hire him” (reverse-coded). Results do not vary if we analyze judgments of 
the target’s character (9-items) and his behavior (4-items) separately. 
To avoid demand characteristics, we administered the praise measure before the 
hypocrisy measure. That is, we did not want to signal to participants that they should consider 
hypocrisy when judging the founder’s praiseworthiness. 
 Attention checks.  Last, two multiple-choice attention checks assessed whether 
participants comprehended the focal domain manipulations of the organization’s work context 
(e.g., investing, infidelity, cooking, television streaming; n = 397) and the target’s private 
behavior (e.g., No, the article did not report any information about his romantic life; Yes, he is 
married and a regular user of Ashley Madison; Yes, he is married and has never cheated in the 
last 12 years; n = 377).  
 Exploratory items. In this and in subsequent studies, participants also rated the company 
on the same 9 semantic differential items used to assess the target person’s character. Because 
our theorizing makes no specific predictions about these items and they yielded inconsistent 
results across studies, we report them in the Online Supplement and do not discuss them further.  
Results and Discussion 
 Supporting our prediction, participants judged the founder who publicly promoted marital 
infidelity as more hypocritical when they knew he privately practiced monogamy (inconsistent-
virtue condition: M = 5.23, SD = 1.42) than when they did not know (no-virtue condition: M = 
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4.62, SD = 1.31), t(309) = 3.93, p < .001, d = .45. That this effect occurred even though the 
inconsistent-virtue condition provided more positive information about the founder than the no-
virtue condition speaks to the effect’s strength. 
 We next examined a potential downstream consequence of these hypocrisy judgments: 
reduced praise. As predicted, enacting virtuous behavior that was inconsistent with his public 
image made the founder seem more hypocritical, which in turn predicted less praise for him and 
his behavior (see Figure 1). That is, we found a significant negative indirect effect of condition 
(coded 1 = inconsistent-virtue; 0 = no-virtue) on praise through hypocrisy, b = -.29, SE = .09, 
bias-corrected 95% CI computed with 5,000 bootstrap resamples = [-.44, -.15] (Hayes, 2013).  
 Finally, we examined whether inconsistent, virtuous behavior reduced the founder’s 
praiseworthiness overall – the total effect of the manipulation on praise without specifying an 
indirect pathway through hypocrisy judgments. We considered this analysis exploratory. On one 
hand, the apparent hypocrisy of the inconsistent-virtue should decrease praise overall, as the 
indirect-effect analysis above suggested. On the other hand, the inconsistent-virtue condition 
provided more positive information about the founder than the no-virtue condition (i.e., that he 
practiced monogamy), which should increase praise overall. It is unclear what the net effect of 
these competing processes will be. The results showed that participants expressed more praise 
for the founder overall when they knew about his marital fidelity (M = 3.10, SD = 1.04) than 
when they did not (M = 2.52, SD = 0.92), t(310) = 5.18, p < .001, d = .59. Thus, in this scenario, 
his fidelity’s virtuousness outweighed its hypocrisy in participants’ overall judgments.4  
 
4 Comparing the manipulation’s total effect on praise (i.e., without specifying the path through hypocrisy) to its 
direct effect on praise (i.e., partialing out the path through hypocrisy) provides a statistical illustration of these 
competing mechanisms. The total effect was significantly weaker than the direct effect, b = .58, SE = .11, p < .001 
and b = .87, SE = .09, p < .001, respectively – a case of statistical suppression (MacKinnon, Krull, & Lockwood, 
2000). Thus, learning that the founder practiced marital fidelity would have increased the praise he received even 
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 To summarize, Study 1 provides initial support for our hypotheses that inconsistency 
between a person’s private virtues and public behavior increases ascriptions of hypocrisy, and 
thereby indirectly reduces how much praise the person receives. As noted, Study 1 provided a 
particularly conservative test because the founder was perceived as more hypocritical in the 
condition in which he was known to do more good (i.e., participants knew that he had been 
faithful only in the inconsistent-virtue condition). Still, a cleaner test of our hypotheses would 
isolate the effect of inconsistency from the effect of doing good. For example, such a test could 
compare judgments of two target people who practice virtue despite preaching vice: one whose 
virtue and vice are directly inconsistent (e.g., publicly promotes smoking, but privately donates 
to anti-smoking causes) and one whose virtue and vice are unrelated (e.g., publicly promotes 
smoking but privately donates to an anti-obesity cause; or publicly promotes unhealthy eating 
but privately donates to an anti-smoking cause). Although both targets practice private virtue in 
all cases, we predict that participants will judge it as more hypocritical if the charitable behavior 
is inconsistent with (vs. unrelated to) public preaching. We predict that these ascriptions of 
hypocrisy will mean greater condemnation of the inconsistent virtue than of the unrelated virtue. 
Study 2 tested this prediction. 
Study 2: Hypocrisy for Combatting Addiction  
 Participants read excerpts from an ostensible case study describing an individual who 
spent time and money privately contributing to a charitable cause (e.g., reducing tobacco use or 
reducing gambling addiction). The materials described an organization where the individual was 
publicly known to work (e.g., consulting for a tobacco or gambling organization) to manipulate 
whether the mission was inconsistent with or unrelated to the individual’s private volunteering.  
 
more if his fidelity had not also made him seem hypocritical (for another suppression effect of hypocrisy, see Effron 
& Monin, 2010). 
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Method 
 Participants. One hundred and eighty-three undergraduate students in the U.S. (Mage = 
20.81 years, SD = 1.10; 106 males, 77 females) were recruited for a case study for course credit. 
With a limited university participant pool, we used a rule-of-thumb to recruit two hundred 
participants, which after some expected attrition and no-shows would be sufficient to detect 
moderate effect sizes across conditions. Applying Study 1’s exclusion criteria, we dropped four 
participants who failed an attention check about the organizational context, seventeen who failed 
a check about the volunteering behavior, and six who spent fewer than four minutes or more than 
twenty-five minutes as the predetermined study duration window. The analyses below are based 
on the remaining 156 responses. The direction and significance of results were unaffected if we 
retained all participants for analysis. 
 Materials. For a study listed as a “Case Analysis,” undergraduates read two excerpts 
about an organization formatted to resemble cases they had read in class. The first excerpt 
described an organization in the “sin industry;” depending on the version, it either helped 
tobacco companies increase sales or helped casinos increase gambling revenue. The second 
excerpt described a vice president of accounting at this organization, Joseph Larson, who has 
been working pro-bono 10 hours per week on non-profit campaigns and making “lump sum 
donations anonymously”; depending on the version, his efforts helped treat either tobacco or 
gambling addiction.  
 We combined these materials to create two randomly assigned conditions: an 
inconsistent-virtue condition in which the individual’s volunteering directly contradicts his 
public behavior (i.e., he publicly promotes but privately fights either tobacco or gambling), and 
an unrelated-virtue condition in which his volunteering does not contradict his public behavior 
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(i.e., he publicly promotes tobacco and privately fights gambling, or vice versa). This design 
ensures the specific virtuous behavior remains unconfounded from its inconsistency with his 
public behavior. 
 Praise measure. After reading these case details, participants responded to the same 13-
item praise scale used in Study 1, with three items revised to fit Study 2’s scenario. Specifically, 
the three items in Study 1 that asked about the founder’s behavior here assessed the individual’s 
volunteering behavior on 7-point scales regarding how honorable, moral, and praiseworthy it 
was. Last, participants responded to the same item, if the target were looking for a job, 
“organizations definitely should not hire him” (reverse coded). As in Study 1, we averaged the 
13 items with appropriate reverse-coding to create a praise measure (α = .91). 
Hypocrisy measure. Next, participants reported how much they thought the individual 
was a hypocrite on the same 5-item scale used in Study 1 (α = .86).  
Harm measure. It is possible that any indirect effect of reduced praise for virtuous 
behavior in the inconsistent-virtue condition could be driven not by hypocrisy judgments of the 
individual, but instead by perceptions that he was directly causing harm to his own organization 
(Effron et al., 2015). To address this potential alternative explanation, participants answered how 
much they agreed or disagreed that the individual’s “actions harmed the organization he works 
for (The Taylor Group)” (1 = Disagree Strongly, 7 = Agree Strongly). This general item 
encompassed a number of types of harm, such as whether his behavior harmed the organization’s 
reputation, its credibility, and its financial standing.  
Attention check. Last, two multiple-choice attention checks assessed whether 
participants comprehended the focal domain manipulations of the organization’s work context 
(e.g., tobacco product sales, gambling revenues, or software development, etc.) and the target’s 
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volunteering behavior (e.g., helping tobacco addiction, helping gambling addiction, working on 
environmental projects, etc.).  
Results  
 Supporting our prediction, participants judged the individual as more hypocritical when 
his private charitable behavior directly contradicted his less-virtuous public behavior than when 
it did not (inconsistent-virtue condition: M = 3.64, SD = 1.16; unrelated-virtue condition: M = 
3.08, SD = 1.06), t(154) = 3.13, p = .002, d = .50.  
Participants also praised the individual less for his charitable behavior when it was 
inconsistent with his public behavior than when it was not (inconsistent-virtue condition: M = 
5.10, SD = 1.00; unrelated-virtue condition: M = 5.46, SD = 0.71), t(154) = 2.57, p = .011, d = 
.41. Thus, doing some good may receive more praise than doing no good overall (Study 1), but 
the same good deeds receive less praise when they contradict one’s public image than when they 
do not (Study 2). Additional analyses showed that the specific type of volunteering behavior or 
work context did not significantly moderate these results.  
Last, we tested and found a significant indirect effect of our manipulation on 
praiseworthiness through hypocrisy, (see Figure 2), b = -.12, SE = .04, bias-corrected 95% CI = 
[-.22, -.05] (Hayes, 2013). Although this finding is consistent with our prediction that hypocrisy 
would result in reduced praise, analyses such as these cannot address the causal order between 
the mediator and the dependent variable (Fiedler, Schott, & Meiser, 2011). Additional details 
about these analyses and other robustness checks are reported in the Online Supplement.  
Discussion 
Study 2’s results provide additional support for our hypotheses. Inconsistency between 
private virtues and public behavior increased ascriptions of hypocrisy. Overall, this meant that an 
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individual received less praise for the exact same charitable behavior (e.g., helping anti-tobacco 
campaigns) when it was inconsistent with his public behavior (e.g., he worked for a tobacco 
company) than when it was not (e.g., he worked for a fast-food company). Participants’ 
perceptions of how much the target person’s virtuous behavior had harmed his company could 
not fully account for these results. 
Study 3: Replicating and Generalizing 
 Study 3 tested the robustness and generalizability of our prior findings in several ways. 
First, whereas Studies 1 and 2 recruited participants from American contexts, Study 3 targeted an 
internationally diverse sample. Second, Study 3 tested our hypotheses across a sample of 20 
different virtue-vice vignette contexts. Finally, although Studies 1 and 2 took pains to present the 
target person’s charitable behaviors as private, it is conceivable that participants inferred that the 
target was still sending false signals to some public audience. To address this limitation, Study 
3’s materials emphasized that the virtuous behaviors were completely private and anonymous, 
explicitly stating that the target never told anyone about the charitable behavior and was the only 
person who knew about it. Study 3 also included a comprehension check to ensure participants 
understood this behavior was truly private. 
Method 
 We pre-registered this study at https://aspredicted.org/fb3e3.pdf.  
Participants. Residents of London, UK enrolled in a business school’s subject pool 
completed this study as part of a series of unrelated studies. Each study session lasted 
approximately 1 hour, and participants received £10. Our pre-registered sample target was 300 
participants based on the resources available and the number of participants required for other 
studies in the series. Because the lab overbooked slots to guard against no-shows, we ended with 
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319 people, each of whom responded to three vignettes for a total of 957 responses. The three 
vignettes were randomly sampled for each participant from our pool of 20 (see below). 
Following our pre-registration, we excluded responses to any vignettes on which a participant 
failed at least one of three attention checks (described below). Our final sample was 317 people 
who provided 847 responses. Of the 314 people who provided demographics, 226 were women, 
105 were men, and 1 was non-binary (45% White, 23% South Asian, 14% East Asian, 6% Black, 
12% other race or ethnicity; Mage = 26.00 years, SD = 9.52). Nationals from 63 different 
countries participated. 
Materials and manipulation. The stimuli were vignettes about organizations that cause 
harm, and people publicly associated with those organizations who act virtuously in private. We 
created these vignettes by writing 20 descriptions of harmful organizations in a variety of 
industries (e.g., a factory farm that abused animals; a for-profit school that charges high tuition 
for second-rate education) and 20 descriptions of an employee’s private, virtuous behavior – one 
for each industry (e.g., making anonymous, lump-sum donations to improve animal welfare or to 
help mentor and tutor high-school students applying to college). Depending on randomly-
assigned condition, participants read vignettes in which the private virtuous behaviors were 
either inconsistent with the employees’ public work (e.g., a factory-farm employee donates to 
help animals) or unrelated to the public work (e.g., a factory-farm employee donates to help 
high-school students). Thus, both conditions used the same harmful organizations and privately 
virtuous employees, but varied which employees worked for which organizations. Each vignette 
emphasized that only the employee knew about the charitable behavior. The Online Supplement 
contains the full text for all materials and attention checks, and more detail about how we 
programmed the randomization.  
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Procedure. Each participant saw a random selection of three vignettes, all in the same 
condition. For each vignette, participants first read about the organization and then answered a 
multiple-choice, comprehension-check question about its industry (e.g., “Based on the vignette 
you read, what does the Taylor Group do?” Answer: factory farming). Next participants read 
about the charitable behavior of an employee at the same organization and answered the same 5-
item hypocrisy scale as in Studies 1-2, a comprehension-check about the charitable behavior 
(“What did Jeff Petersen do in the last story you read?” Answer: donated to protect animal 
welfare), and a comprehension check about how many other people knew about the employee’s 
donation behavior (Answer: no one else knew).  
Results 
 As hypothesized, collapsing across the three repeated measures, participants thought the 
target person was more hypocritical in the inconsistent-virtue condition (M = 3.76, SD = 1.40) 
than in the unrelated-virtue condition (M = 3.23, SD = 1.41), d = .37. This difference was 
significant in a mixed regression model with fixed effects for condition (1 = inconsistent-virtue, 
0 = unrelated-virtue), the specific charitable behavior, and whether a response corresponded to 
the first, second, or third vignette they rated (dummy-coded), plus random intercepts for 
participants to account for the fact that each participant responded to up to three vignettes, b = 
.54, SEb = .13, z = 4.07, p < .001 by either a pre-registered one-tailed test or a two-tailed test.  
 As a robustness check, we planned to rerun the analyses, including participants’ 
responses only if they correctly recalled that the target person’s donation had been completely 
anonymous. However, this check proved unnecessary because all participants correctly recalled 
the relevant information (i.e., that only the target employee knew about the donation behavior). 
Discussion 
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Study 3’s results replicate our primary finding from Studies 1 and 2. Participants rated 
the target individuals’ private and anonymous virtuous behavior as more hypocritical when it 
was inconsistent with the targets’ public image at work – even though participants confirmed 
they understood that the private behavior was completely unknown to anyone but the target 
people themselves. Attesting to the generalizability of our results, these effects emerged with 
internationally diverse participants judging virtues and vices related to 20 different contexts – 
from employee rights to animal welfare to childhood education. 
The false-signaling perspective on hypocrisy would not have predicted the results of 
Studies 1–3, because the target people did not send others a false signal of virtue; only the targets 
themselves knew about their private good deeds. By contrast, the results fit well with the 
undeserved-benefits perspective. Participants may have interpreted the private behaviors as 
indicating that the targets were trying to morally cleanse themselves by assuaging their guilt in 
order to feel more virtuous. However, our studies thus far have not directly measured whether 
participants interpreted the private behaviors in this way. Study 4 tests mediation by such a 
measure.  
Study 4: Mediation by Guilt Reduction 
 Study 4’s participants again read about a target person whose private virtues were either 
inconsistent with or unrelated to his less-than-virtuous public work. This time, they also 
indicated how much they thought the target had performed these virtues to alleviate his guilt. We 
predicted that participants would infer stronger guilt-reduction motives when the private virtues 
were inconsistent with the public work, which in turn would predict participants perceiving more 
hypocrisy and offering less praise.   
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Recall that we were agnostic about whether successful moral-cleansing would be 
necessary for private virtues to appear hypocritical, or whether attempted moral-cleansing would 
be sufficient. Study 4 does not attempt to distinguish between these possibilities with its measure 
of guilt-reduction motives, because such motives could precede both successful and unsuccessful 
attempts. Study 5 teases apart these possibilities with an experimental manipulation.  
Method 
Participants. We recruited 450 participants from MTurk in exchange for $.55 (Mage = 
38.04 years, SD = 12.81; 212 males, 238 females; 78% employed full- or part-time, 21% full 
students not employed). Based on Study 1 and 2’s results, we used a rule-of-thumb that 200 
people per condition would be sufficient to detect our predicted effects, including some attrition. 
After applying the same exclusion criteria from Studies 1 and 2, 409 participants remained. The 
direction and significance of results was the same when we retained all participants for analysis. 
Materials. The design was similar to Study 2. For a study called “Attitudes and 
Perceptions of a Company Profile,” participants read two ostensible excerpts from a case study. 
The first described an organization, the Taylor Group, whose mission was to increase sales of 
either tobacco or fast-food. The second excerpt described an employee, Joseph Larson, who 
privately volunteered to combat either tobacco addiction or obesity. To emphasize that the 
volunteering was private, the materials stated that the individual works on these charitable causes 
from his “personal computer in his private home and never tells anyone about it,” and, similar to 
Studies 2-3, that whenever he donates, he does so anonymously. Like Studies 2-3, combining 
these materials produced an inconsistent-virtue condition in which his charitable work directly 
contradicted his public behavior (i.e., he publicly promotes but privately fights tobacco, or 
publicly promotes fast food but privately fights obesity) and an unrelated-virtue condition in 
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which his charity and his work are not inconsistent (i.e., he publicly promotes tobacco and 
privately fights obesity, or publicly promotes fast food and privately fights tobacco). As in 
Studies 2-3, this design avoids confounding the specific virtuous behavior with the manipulation 
of inconsistency. The Online Supplement reports the material’s full text. 
Measures. After reading both excerpts, participants answered the 13-item praise scale 
from Study 2 (α = .96), the 5-item hypocrisy scale from Studies 1-3 (main dependent measure; α 
= .94), and the harm item from Study 2 (covariate). 
Moral cleansing involves behaviors intended to reduce one’s guilt (Gollwitzer & Melzer, 
2012; Lee & Schwarz, 2010). Thus, for our moral cleansing measure (and proposed mediator), 
participants completed a 5-item guilt scale adapted from prior research (Izard, Libero, Putnam, & 
Haynes, 1993), indicating their agreement that the target was motivated by feeling guilt, regret, 
remorse, blameworthy, and responsible for wrongdoing (1= Disagree Strongly, 7 = Agree 
Strongly; α = .97). As noted, this measure does not distinguish between perceptions of attempted 
vs. successful guilt reduction because participants who infer that the target person was motivated 
by guilt may also infer that he successfully reduced his guilt.  
Last, attention checks asked whether individuals were able to correctly recall the Taylor 
Group’s mission and target individual’s behavior. 
Results 
 As in Studies 1-3, and supporting our prediction, participants judged the individual as 
more hypocritical when his private volunteering directly contradicted his less-virtuous public 
behavior than when it did not (inconsistent-virtue: M = 3.86, SD = 1.62; unrelated-virtue: M = 
3.30, SD = 1.60), t(407) = 3.51, p = .001, d = .35. Going beyond our previous studies, 
participants thought that guilt was more likely to have motivated the target’s private good deeds 
Moral Cleansing as Hypocrisy 29 
in the inconsistent-virtue condition (M = 4.78, SD = 1.57) than in the unrelated-virtue condition 
(M = 3.48, SD = 1.73), t(407) = 7.95, p < .001, d = .79. As in Study 2, they also found the 
individual less praiseworthy overall in the inconsistent-virtue condition (M = 5.18, SD = 1.24) 
than in the unrelated-virtue condition (M = 5.39, SD = 1.17), but this effect was not significant, 
t(407) = 1.77, p = .077, d = .18. As before, the specific context of volunteering or organization 
mission did not significantly moderate these results. 
Last, we replicated the same indirect effect that we found in Study 2, from the 
manipulation (inconsistent-virtue coded +1; unrelated-virtue coded –1), to hypocrisy, to praise, b 
= -.15, SE = .05, bias-corrected 95% CI = [-.24, -.07], computed with 5,000 bootstrap resamples 
(Hayes, 2013). Going beyond our previous studies, we also found a significant indirect effect 
from the manipulation (inconsistent-virtue = 1, unrelated-virtue = -1) through guilt-reduction to 
hypocrisy judgments, b = .33, SE = .05, bias-corrected 95% CI [.24, .43], computed with 5,000 
bootstrap resamples. We also found a significant indirect effect such that the target’s 
inconsistency made him appear more motivated by guilt, which in turn predicted higher 
hypocrisy ratings, which in turn predicted lower praise for his good deeds, b = -.19, SE = .03, 
bias-corrected 95% CI [-.26, -.13] (see Figure 3). The Online Supplement reports additional 
details about these indirect effects, as well as structural equation analyses suggesting that the 
relevant models fit the data better than plausible alternative models. 
Replications 
The Online Supplement reports two additional studies that replicated the main effect of 
condition on hypocrisy and the indirect effect from the manipulation through guilt-reduction and 
hypocrisy to praise.  
Discussion 
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Study 4 replicates Studies 1–3: People found a target person more hypocritical when his 
virtues were inconsistent with (vs. unrelated to) his vices, even though the materials clearly 
stated that the target enacted the virtue in private and never told anyone about it. Going beyond 
Studies 1–3, the results offer mediational evidence consistent with our proposed moral-cleansing 
mechanism. Specifically, participants were more likely to explain a target person’s private 
virtuous behavior as focused on reducing his guilt when it was inconsistent with (vs. unrelated 
to) his public vices – and these imputed attributions in turn predicted harsher hypocrisy 
judgments. These results fit with our claim that audiences will find an actor’s private virtues 
more hypocritical to the extent that audiences interpret these virtues as moral cleansing.  
However, as with any measurement-of-mediation design, we cannot draw causal 
conclusions about the relationship between the mediation and the dependent variable, nor can we 
rule out the role of other, unmeasured variables (Bullock, Green, & Ha, 2010; Fiedler et al., 
2011). Moreover, it is unclear whether participants in this study saw hypocrisy in the target 
person’s attempt at moral cleansing, or whether they inferred hypocrisy because they presumed 
that the moral cleansing had been successful and the target person felt absolved of guilt for his 
public vices. Study 5 addresses these issues by directly manipulating the moral cleansing 
mechanism and distinguishing between attempted and successful guilt-reduction. 
Study 5: Why Charity Becomes Hypocrisy –  
Attempted or Successful Guilt Reduction?  
Study 5’s participants read about the harmful public behavior of a target person whose 
private charitable contribution was described (a) as a successful attempt to alleviate his guilt, (b) 
as an unsuccessful attempt to alleviate his guilt, or (c) without mentioning any such feelings 
(control condition). In this way, Study 5 directly manipulated moral cleansing. If attempted 
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moral cleansing is sufficient to produce hypocrisy judgments, then participants should perceive 
more hypocrisy in the two conditions involving guilt motives than in the control condition. If, on 
the other hand, successful moral cleansing is necessary to appear hypocritical in this context, 
then participants should perceive more hypocrisy in the first condition than in the other two.  
The undeserved-benefits perspective posits that moral cleansing seems hypocritical to the 
extent that it involves feeling (or attempting to feel) more virtuous than one deserves. Study 5 
thus included a direct measure of how much participants thought the target person felt overly 
virtuous and tested this measure as a mediator. 
Study 4 suggests that private good deeds seem more like an attempt to reduce guilt when 
they are inconsistent with (vs. unrelated to) a person’s less-virtuous public image. However, the 
undeserved-benefits perspective does not require that a person display inconsistency to be 
perceived as hypocritical. Inconsistency can be a cue that a person is claiming such a benefit, but 
it is not the only cue (cf. Monin & Merritt, 2012). Study 5 tested the prediction that even when 
the target person’s public and private behavior are not directly contradictory, the target will seem 
more hypocritical when the private behavior involved (successful or perhaps merely attempted) 
moral cleansing. In other words, we tested whether manipulating the target’s guilt reduction 
could “turn on” hypocrisy judgments in the condition that seemed least hypocritical to our 
previous studies’ participants (i.e., the unrelated-virtue condition). Thus, all participants 
considered a target person who did something charitable in a domain unrelated to his public 
image (e.g., a fast-food executive who contributes to anti-smoking causes). 
To ensure that participants understood the target person’s good deeds were 
unambiguously private and anonymous, Study 5 participants read that no one else knew about 
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the charitable behavior, and then completed a comprehension check. Additionally, we tested 
generalizability to non-American participant populations. 
Method 
 We preregistered the study at https://aspredicted.org/hr8pw.pdf. 
 Participants. Twelve hundred participants signed up for “A Business Profile Study” on 
Prolific Academic (ProA), a UK-based online data collection platform whose participants have 
been shown to be more diverse and provide data of comparable, if not higher, quality compared 
to competing platforms (Peer, Brandimarte, Samat, & Acquisti, 2017). To recruit English-
speaking participants outside North America, we restricted our sample to individuals from the 
U.K., Australia, New Zealand, and Ireland (Mage = 36.46 years, SD = 13.25; 747 female (66%), 
381 male (34%), 85 (7%) no response; 78.6% employed full or part-time). To ensure the total 
number of completed responses, the system allowed 1275 participants to begin the survey. Each 
participant earned $1.21 for completing the study.  
Materials. Similar to previous studies, participants read a two-part vignette labeled as a 
“Business Profile” task. The first part described an ostensibly real pharmaceutical organization, 
Pantheon Pharma, that manufactures popular opioid pain-relief medications that are highly 
addictive and linked with life-threatening outcomes. The description was based on the recent 
case of Purdue Pharma and the Sackler family, who manufactured the opioid OxyContin (Van 
Zee, 2009). The article described the family who owns the company and marketed these drugs 
knowing that they were associated with life-threatening addictive risks.  
The vignette’s second part described an employee at the company who recently made a 
charitable contribution to an unrelated cause: an art museum (a detail from the real Purdue 
Pharma case). In this second vignette, we randomly assigned participants to one of three 
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conditions: control, guilt-persists (i.e., attempted moral cleansing), and guilt-relief (i.e., 
successful moral cleansing). All participants read about the same charitable behavior of 
Raymond Sampson, current CEO of Pantheon Pharma. In the control condition, participants read 
that Sampson is a “long-time art lover and collector. Recently, he decided to make an 
anonymous donation to an art museum in the northeastern United States. Sampson made the 
donation anonymously and in a lump-sum payment so that he would be the only person who 
knew about it.”  
In both the guilt-persists and guilt-relief conditions, participants also read about why he 
donated: “In recent years, he has felt increasing guilt about the company’s actions and patient 
outcomes linked to Pantheon’s addictive painkillers.” Then participants in the guilt-persists 
condition read: 
After making the donation to the art museums, Sampson feels no relief and just as bad, if 
not worse, about himself than he did before. Given what his company did, he still feels 
guilty. He can’t sleep at night and thinks of himself as a bad person. ‘I feel so guilty,’ he 
thinks to himself.  
 
In the guilt-relief condition, participants instead read: 
After making the donation to the art museums, Sampson feels overwhelming relief and 
much better about himself. Despite what his company did, he doesn’t feel guilty 
anymore. Now he can sleep at night and feels like he can return to thinking of himself as 
a good person. ‘Goodbye guilt,’ he thinks to himself. 
 
The Online Supplement contains the full text of these materials. 
Measures. Participants answered the 13-item praise scale from Studies 2–4 (α = .94) and 
the 5-item hypocrisy from Studies 1–4 (α = .86). As a manipulation check, participants answered 
a 6-item guilt scale similar to Study 4’s, but slightly re-worded to assess how much guilt he felt 
after making the donation (α = .92).  
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As a direct measure of the undeserved moral benefits the target person might experience 
in this context, Study 5 asked participants whether he felt more virtuous than he deserves to feel 
using a 7-item measure: “After donating, to what extent do you think that Raymond Sampson 
feels…better about himself, more pleased, more proud, less regretful, less remorseful, less guilty, 
and more virtuous…” Each item ended with “…than he deserves” (1= Disagree Strongly, 7 = 
Agree Strongly; α = .96). We put this measure last so it could not influence participants’ 
responses to the other measures. Our pre-registered prediction was that if participants perceived 
more hypocrisy in the guilt-relief condition than in the guilt-persists and control conditions, then 
this measure would mediate the effect. 
Following our pre-registration, we excluded individuals who failed at least one of the 
multiple-choice attention checks that assessed whether participants were able to recall Pantheon 
Pharma’s behavior (Answer: “Manufacture and market painkiller drugs”; n = 140), where the 
CEO made his donation (Answer: “To an art museum”; n = 178) and how private and 
anonymous the donation was (“How many people know about the donation that Sampson 
made?” Answer: “Only Sampson knows”; n = 213). As before, we also excluded any 
participants with duplicate IP addresses (n = 53) or with an IP address outside the restrictions 
specified on the Prolific platform (n = 16). The analyses below are based on the remaining 
participants (N = 1,008). All results had the same direction and significance-level when we 
included all complete responses. 
Because we tested the three conditions in a context where the donation behavior was 
unrelated to the work behavior, this study did not collect perceptions of harm to the organization. 
Results 
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Manipulation check. Confirming that participants interpreted the manipulation as we 
expected, their ratings of the target’s guilty feelings differed significantly by condition, F(2, 
1005) = 860.26, p < .001. Participants thought the target felt significantly less guilt in the guilt-
relief condition (M = 2.18, SD = 1.05) compared to both the guilt-persists condition (M = 5.09, 
SD = 1.09), t(1005) = 37.10, p < .001, d = 2.72, and the control condition (M = 2.38, SD = 0.91), 
t(1005) = 2.53, p = .012, d =.24. The latter two conditions were also significantly different from 
one another, t(1005) = 34.35, p < .001, d = 2.70.  
Hypocrisy. Hypocrisy ratings differed significantly among the three conditions, F(2, 
1005) = 46.98, p < .001 in a one-way ANOVA, and pairwise comparisons suggest that successful 
guilt-reduction was necessary to appear hypocritical, whereas attempted guilt-reduction was 
insufficient. Specifically, people rated the target as more hypocritical when his donation 
successfully alleviated his guilt about selling opioids (guilt-relief condition: M = 5.33, SD = 
1.19) compared to when the donation failed its intended purpose (guilt-persists condition: M = 
4.48, SD = 1.14), t(1005) = 9.54, p < .001, d = .72, and also compared to when no information 
about its purpose or effect was provided (control condition: M = 4.76, SD = 1.18), t(1005) = 
6.28, p < .001, d = .48. Interestingly, participants rated the target person as less hypocritical in 
the guilt-persists condition than in the control condition, t(1005) = 3.16, p = .002, d = .24, 
perhaps because they gave him moral credit for continuing to feel guilty about selling opioids 
(Barasch et al., 2014; Stearns & Parrott, 2012). 
Feeling better than he deserved. Our direct measure of undeserved moral benefits 
showed similar results. Participants thought that the target felt better than he deserved to feel 
when his donation absolved his guilt (M = 6.12, SD = 1.09), compared to when his guilt persisted 
(M = 3.36 SD = 1.48), t(1005) = 28.53, p < .001, d = 2.12, and also compared to the control 
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condition (M = 5.28, SD = 1.17), t(1005) = 8.59, p < .001, d = .73. Interestingly, participants also 
thought that he felt worse than he deserved to feel when his guilt persisted, compared to the 
control condition, t(1005) = 19.73, p < .001, d = 1.44.  
Following our pre-registered analysis plan, we also found a significant indirect effect of 
condition (guilt-relief = +2, guilt-persists = -1, control = -1) on hypocrisy through perceptions 
that the target felt better than he deserved, b = .19, SE = .02, bias-corrected 95% CI = [.16, .23]. 
The Online Supplement reports additional details about this indirect effect. 
Praise. The amount of praise participants gave the target for acting virtuously depended 
on the condition, F(2, 1005) = 49.32, p < .001. Participants rated the target as significantly less 
praiseworthy for the same charitable donation when he experienced guilt-relief (M = 2.53, SD = 
1.12) than when his guilt persisted (M = 3.37, SD = 1.12), t(1005) = 9.39, p <.001, d = .75, and 
also compared to the control condition (M = 3.21, SD = 1.25), t(1005) = 7.50, p <.001, d = .57. 
The difference between the guilt-persists and control conditions was not significant, t(1005) = 
1.79, p = .075, d = .13. Consistent with our pre-registered analysis plan, we also found that there 
was a significant indirect effect from this successful guilt-reduction condition (coded: +2; guilt-
persists -1, control -1) on praise, through perceptions that the target feels better than he deserves 
to feel, and through hypocrisy judgments (see Figure 4), b = -.12, SE = .01, bias-corrected 95% 
CI = [-.15, -.10], computed with 5,000 bootstrap resamples (Hayes, 2013). The Online 
Supplement reports additional robustness tests of the indirect effects on praise. 
Discussion 
Studies 1-4 have argued that people view a target person as more hypocritical when his 
private virtues are inconsistent (vs. not inconsistent) with his or her public vices because the 
inconsistency makes the private virtues seem like moral cleansing. Whereas Study 4’s mediation 
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analysis provided correlational evidence consistent with this mechanism, Study 5 provided 
causal evidence by directly manipulating moral cleansing (Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005). The 
same private, virtuous behavior seemed more hypocritical when it alleviated the target person’s 
guilt for his public vices than when it did not. The results also clarify a boundary condition: 
Using private virtues as a strategy to cleanse one’s conscience may only seem hypocritical if the 
strategy works. In fact, perhaps because feeling guilty implies one has a conscience (Ketelaar & 
Tung Au, 2003; Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney et al., 2007), continuing to feel guilty after 
attempted moral cleansing appears to send a positive signal to others (Barasch et al., 2014; 
Stearns & Parrott, 2012; Tangney & Dearing, 2002).  
Why did participants perceive successful guilt-reduction as hypocritical? We predicted 
that a person who alleviated his guilt about selling harmful opioids by anonymously donating to 
the arts would be perceived as feeling more virtuous than he deserved – and this is exactly how 
participants perceived him. At least in this context, using good deeds to alleviate your guilt was 
tantamount to claiming an undeserved moral benefit. 
Meta-Analysis 
 To more precisely estimate the size of our effects across all individual studies, including 
the two studies reported in the Online Supplement, we performed an internal meta-analysis. Our 
goals were to help future researchers estimate statistical power for studying our effect, and also 
to assess the robustness of the effect of inconsistency on praise, which (in contrast to the effect of 
inconsistency on hypocrisy) was not statistically significant in all studies. 
Overall, our hypotheses received consistent support across seven studies (see Tables 1 
and 2). Because Studies 1 and 5 did not include a separate unrelated-virtues condition, we could 
not include them in the analysis. Using Stata’s metan function (Harris et al., 2008), we treated 
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study as a random effect, but treating it as a fixed effect using the inverse variance method 
produced identical conclusions.5 
First, we examined the manipulation’s effect on hypocrisy. Recall that each of Study 3’s 
participants could respond to three vignettes; we computed Study 3’s effect size based on each 
participant’s mean hypocrisy rating across the three. As shown in Figure 5, participants in each 
study judged the target person as more hypocritical when his private virtues were inconsistent 
with his public behavior (supporting our focal prediction); across studies, the effect size was 
modest, d = .44 [.35, .54], and equivalent to the average effect size in published psychology 
research (i.e., r = .21, equivalent to d = .43; Richard, Bond, & Stokes-Zoota, 2003).  
Next, we examined the effect of performing inconsistent (vs. unrelated) virtues on praise. 
Recall that except in Study 3 where we did not measure praise, our other studies all found 
significant indirect effects from the inconsistency manipulation to praise. However, the total 
effect of the manipulation on praise was not significant in all studies. Our theorizing does not 
require a total effect, but meta-analytically examining its reliability is useful for understanding 
inconsistency’s potential downstream consequences. Across studies, there was a small but 
significant effect of the inconsistency manipulation on praise (see Figure 6), such that 
participants praised the same behavior less when it was inconsistent with (vs. unrelated to) a 
person’s public behavior, d = .18 [.08, .29]. In addition to providing a better estimate of effect 
sizes across our studies, the meta-analysis also suggests that the manipulation’s effect on 
hypocrisy and praise is reliable. 
General Discussion 
 
5 Supplementary Study S1 included two hypocrisy measures that showed the same results. We averaged them for 
the meta-analysis, but the results are consistent if we use either measure independently. Results are also consistent if 
we include the Study 1 data. The metan function estimates random effects using the DerSimonian-Laird method. 
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Scholars typically characterize hypocrites as individuals who appear more virtuous in 
public than they behave in private. Yet in seven experiments with vignettes about 24 different 
behaviors and participants from more than 60 nationalities, we find that laypeople also judge 
others as hypocritical for virtuous private actions that directly contradict less-virtuous public 
behaviors. Participants viewed a founder who preached marital infidelity as more hypocritical 
when he privately practiced fidelity than when he did not (Study 1), and individuals working in a 
“sin-industry” as more hypocritical when their private volunteering behavior helped the very 
people their organizations harmed than when it helped people not harmed by their organizations 
(Studies 2-4, and Supplementary Studies S1-S2). Overall, the same private good deeds received 
less praise when they directly contradicted public vices than when they did not (Meta-Analysis), 
an effect that was associated with hypocrisy judgments in mediation tests (Studies 2 and 4, and 
Supplementary Studies S1-S2). For example, an individual received less praise for volunteering 
to fight tobacco addiction when he worked for a tobacco company than when he worked for a 
casino. Even when good deeds are private, anonymous, and secret – i.e., they are not motivated 
by a desire to manage others’ impressions – the moral credit one receives for them depends on 
whether they contradict one’s public behavior.  
Why do private good deeds invite hypocrisy judgments when they contradict one’s public 
behavior? It is easier to infer that the actor is trying to use these good deeds to compensate for 
harmful public behavior when the good deeds are directly inconsistent with the harm. For 
example, such moral cleansing is a more salient explanation for why a tobacco executive secretly 
donates to anti-tobacco causes than for why the executive secretly donates to anti-gambling 
causes. People give others less credit for moral behavior than the others give themselves (Effron, 
2014; Kruger & Gilovich, 2004), and they assume others will overclaim credit for positive 
Moral Cleansing as Hypocrisy 40 
outcomes (Kruger & Gilovich, 1999). Thus, observers may readily suspect that moral cleansing 
makes the actor feel more virtuous than they think she deserves. For example, they might infer 
that the anti-tobacco donation was an all-too-easy way to purchase a clean conscience. More 
generally, failing to practice in private the exact behavior you promote in public can suggest to 
observers that you are enjoying an undeserved moral benefit (Effron, O’Connor, et al., 2018), 
regardless of whether you are promoting virtue or vice. If you publicly promote virtue while 
privately practicing vice, the moral benefit is appearing more virtuous than you deserve. If you 
publicly promote vice while privately practicing virtue, the moral benefit is feeling more virtuous 
than you deserve.  
Three key results support this interpretation of our findings. First, Study 4’s participants 
were more likely to infer that a target person acted virtuously in order to alleviate his guilt when 
the good deeds were directly inconsistent with his less-virtuous public behavior than when they 
were not – and these inferences mediated an indirect effect from inconsistency to hypocrisy.  
This finding supports our prediction that inconsistency with public behavior would make good 
deeds seem like moral cleansing. Second, directly manipulating moral cleansing had a causal 
effect on hypocrisy judgments while holding inconsistency constant. That is, Study 5’s 
participants ascribed more hypocrisy to the target person when his good deeds alleviated his guilt 
about his public behavior than when his good deeds did not. Third, we found direct evidence that 
people associate hypocrisy with undeserved moral benefits. Telling Study 5’s participants that 
the target person had alleviated his guilt led them to infer that he felt more virtuous than he 
deserved, which in turn predicted how hypocritical they found him. 
Theoretical Contributions 
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Our findings make several theoretical contributions. First, we demonstrate that people 
conceptualize hypocrisy more broadly than previously appreciated. Although the canonical 
hypocrite is someone who privately practices the same vice she publicly preaches against (Crisp 
& Cowton, 1994; Stone & Fernandez, 2008), we show that audiences will levy a hypocrisy 
penalty even when the vice is public and the virtue is private. Even in the absence of virtue-
preaching, unambiguously prosocial behaviors like volunteering or donating to charity can seem 
more hypocritical if they directly contradict less-virtuous public behaviors. 
Second, our results distinguish between two competing theories of hypocrisy: the false-
signaling perspective (Jordan et al., 2017) and the undeserved-benefits perspective (Effron, 
O'Connor et al., 2018). Both theories predict that people will perceive hypocrisy in someone who 
privately practices the same vice she publicly preaches against. The inconsistency between her 
public preaching and her private virtue suggests that she appears more virtuous than she is – a 
“false signal” that counts as an undeserved moral benefit. Both theories can thus account for 
most prior work on lay judgments of hypocrisy, because this work mainly measures judgments 
of target people who act more virtuously in public than in private. However, the false-signaling 
perspective cannot account for the present findings. Because the target people in our scenarios 
acted more virtuously in private than in public, they did not falsely signal virtuousness to others 
– if anything, their public behavior undersells their prosocial behaviors – yet participants still 
perceived this inconsistency as hypocrisy (Studies 1–4). Moreover, manipulating a target 
person’s private feelings affected how hypocritical he seemed to participants (Study 5), and a 
measure of private feelings mediated the effect of the target’s inconsistency on participants’ 
judgments of hypocrisy (Study 4). These effects occurred even though the studies held constant 
the target people’s public behavior and thus the signals they sent to others. 
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In contrast to the false-signaling perspective, the undeserved-benefits perspective predicts 
exactly these findings. Private virtues that contradict public vices are also seen as claiming an 
undeserved moral benefit: feeling virtuous despite one’s public vices. The extent to which one 
enjoys this benefit depends on private feelings (e.g., guilt), even holding public and private 
behaviors constant. And indeed, participants were more likely to identify the target person as 
feeling more virtuous than he deserved when his private virtues alleviated his guilt about his 
public behavior (Study 5).  
 Although the false-signaling perspective was only recently formalized and tested (Jordan 
et al., 2017), its assumption that hypocrisy requires presenting oneself as more virtuous than one 
truly is has guided much prior work (Aronson, Fried, & Stone, 1991; Batson et al., 1997; Monin 
& Merritt, 2012; Stone & Fernandez, 2008; Stone et al., 1997). Our results require rethinking this 
assumption. We do not challenge the notion that hypocrisy can involve deceitfully virtuous 
public display, but we argue that lay conceptualizations of hypocrisy are not fundamentally about 
false signals to others (see also Alicke et al., 2013; Hale & Pillow, 2015). It is worth 
emphasizing again that the undeserved-benefits perspective encompasses the false-signaling 
perspective. Appearing virtuous to others is a moral benefit, and so is feeling virtuous. People do 
not like those who claim either benefit without deserving it.  
A potential way to reconcile our findings with the false-signaling perspective is to 
speculate that participants believed the target’s private behavior falsely signaled a virtuous 
character to themselves. This intrapersonal interpretation is consistent with our claim that the 
targets were penalized for feeling more virtuous than they deserved. Said differently, the targets 
seem to have interpreted their private behavior as more of a “true signal” about their own moral 
character than participants thought they should. However, the idea that private behavior can 
Moral Cleansing as Hypocrisy 43 
represent a false signal to oneself stretches the false-signaling theory of hypocrisy beyond its 
original formulation. Jordan and colleagues explicitly theorize that “hypocrites are disliked 
because they use their condemnation to mislead other people about their moral behavior” (Jordan 
et al., 2017, p. 356-357, italics added). Normative arguments about how hypocrisy should be 
defined similarly emphasize the importance of presenting a deceitfully virtuous image to an 
external audience (Monin & Merritt, 2012). Some researchers have argued that claiming to be 
fair in public while acting unfairly in private can involve self-deception (Batson et al., 1997, 
1999), but studies on lay judgments of hypocrisy have treated self-deception as a factor that 
could mitigate hypocrisy (see Alicke et al., 2013, Scenario 1, p. 682). Thus, even considering 
that “feeling more virtuous than you deserve” could be described as false signaling to the self, 
our findings would not have been predicted by previous theoretical approaches to hypocrisy, 
which posit a central role of managing others’ impressions. 
In addition to supporting the undeserved-benefits theory of hypocrisy, our findings 
sharpen the theory. Previously, it was unclear whether attempting to obtain an undeserved moral 
benefit is sufficient to appear hypocritical, or whether successfully obtaining it is necessary 
(Effron, O’Connor, et al., 2018). Our results were more consistent with the latter possibility, at 
least when the moral benefit is feeling virtuous. In Study 5, learning that a secret charitable 
donation had successfully alleviated a target person’s guilt made him seem more hypocritical, 
but learning that his donation was motivated by guilt without successfully alleviating it made 
him seem less hypocritical.  
These findings point to an additional theoretical contribution: our demonstration that guilt 
can make people appear hypocritical. On one hand, guilt is a “moral emotion” that can drive pro-
social behavior (Andreoni, 1990; de Hooge, Nelissen, Breugelmans, & Zeelenberg, 2011; 
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Ketelaar & Tung Au, 2003; Nelissen, Dijker, & deVries, 2007; Tangney & Dearing, 2002; 
Tangney et al., 2007). Laypeople tend to interpret moral emotions as indicative of moral 
character (Barasch et al., 2014), so virtuous behavior motivated by guilt may receive positive 
evaluations. On the other hand, virtues motivated by guilt could be seen as attempts to claim 
undeserved moral benefits, which would elicit negative evaluations. Study 5’s results reconcile 
these competing predictions by suggesting that people will offer more praise for a good deed 
when it is motivated by guilt, but may offer less praise when the good deed successfully 
alleviates the guilt. A clean conscience can seem hypocritical if people suspect you feel more 
virtuous than you deserve. 
Finally, our studies provide a novel perspective on moral cleansing and the potential 
disconnect between how people view their own versus others’ good deeds. Previous work has 
shown that, following wrongdoing, individuals are motivated to reduce negative emotional states 
through moral cleansing (de Hooge et al., 2011; Gollwitzer & Melzer, 2012; Jordan et al., 2011; 
Mazar & Zhong, 2010; Sachdeva et al., 2009; Tangney et al., 2007; Tetlock et al., 2000). 
However, our studies are the first to our knowledge to directly examine how others evaluate 
behavior they perceive as moral cleansing. To oneself, these actions might resolve discomfort 
and make individuals feel a sense of enhanced or repaired moral identity. To others, however, 
these same actions may lead audiences to interpret good deeds that seem inconsistent with prior 
behavior as more hypocritical. The implication is that successful moral cleansing may wash 
away guilt, but leave the stain of hypocrisy.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
A potential alternative explanation is that participants saw hypocrisy in the possibility 
that the target person’s charitable behavior might enable his vice behaviors at the harmful 
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organization. For example, by alleviating his guilt with an anti-tobacco donation, the tobacco 
executive might feel licensed to continue peddling tobacco (Effron, 2016; Effron & Conway, 
2015; Effron & Monin, 2010). This explanation is similar to our own because it involves guilt 
reduction, but different because it assumes that guilt reduction is only hypocritical insofar as it 
enables the target person to continue causing harm. However, a study reported in the Online 
Supplement (Supplementary Study S1) found no support for this alternative. Participants read 
about a target who attempts to leave a harmful organization, but must continue to work there due 
to external constraints (e.g., a bad economy and no available job options) not because his 
charitable behavior enables him to stay. The results showed that participants still levied a 
hypocrisy penalty when the same virtuous behavior was inconsistent with (vs. unrelated to) the 
target’s employment. Being forced to stay at the harmful organization did not interact with the 
inconsistent- vs. unrelated-virtue condition, and the effect sizes of these hypocrisy judgments for 
the target’s charitable behavior were not measurably different when he could not leave the 
organization as when he could leave (ds = .47 vs. .49). The virtuous behavior may have 
alleviated his guilt about working at the organization, but it was not what caused him to stay. 
Thus, private good deeds can seem hypocritical even when they do not license harmful public 
behavior. 
Feeling virtuous about good deeds should not always evoke hypocrisy. Our results 
suggest that private good deeds can seem hypocritical if they make an actor seem like he feels 
more virtuous than he deserves, and prior research suggests that observers have good reason to 
expect an actor to give himself more credit for his good deeds than observers are prepared to 
give (Effron, 2014; Kruger & Gilovich, 2004), particularly when they are aware of the actor’s 
transgressions (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). Nonetheless, the right behavior can probably 
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convince observers that an actor has earned a clear conscience after transgressing, and the 
undeserved-benefits perspective predicts that observers would not perceive hypocrisy in such 
situations. For example, donating to the arts was apparently not an adequate basis, in the eyes of 
Study 5’s participants, for feeling absolved of guilt after pushing addictive and lethal opioids 
– but donating one’s entire fortune and devoting the remainder of one’s life to fight poverty 
might have been seen as meriting a reduction in guilt. The question of what behaviors will 
convince observers that a clean conscience does not imply hypocrisy must await future research.  
Our research captured a range of contexts, and our experimental methodology allowed us 
to directly test perceptions of the exact same behaviors under conditions holding all else equal. 
That said, experimental vignette studies can raise questions about generalizability to real-world 
situations. To limit concerns about generalizability, our vignettes used real-world organizational 
examples (Study 1 and 5), realistic materials such as news articles (Study 1), and familiar case 
formatting relevant to our student population (Study 2). A second limitation is that all our 
vignettes, inspired by real-world examples of the phenomenon they aimed to capture, equated the 
target’s public behavior with a professional role such as pharmaceutical executive. We predict 
that our findings would generalize to non-professional contexts, but we leave that question to be 
addressed by future research. Third, it is important not to overinterpret the data from mediation 
analysis as causal evidence of mechanism  (Bullock et al., 2010; Fiedler et al., 2011; Green et al., 
2010). To bolster Study 4’s mediational data with causal evidence, Study 5 manipulated our 
proposed mechanism. Fourth, future research should explore cultural differences in the results, as 
people make different attributions about moral inconsistency outside the West (Effron, Markus, 
et al., 2018). The majority of our studies were conducted with participants from the United 
States, although two studies with internationally diverse samples – including more than 60 
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nationalities from North and South America, Europe, Africa, Asia, and Oceania – showed broad 
evidence of cross-cultural generalizability (Studies 3 and 5).  
A final limitation is that we were not able to test all incarnations of hypocrisy. On one 
hand, the fact that private and anonymous good deeds can seem hypocritical implies that false 
moral signals (Jordan et al., 2017), the intent to deceive others (Crisp & Cowton, 1994), and 
publicly condemning others (see Crisp & Cowton, 1994; Hale & Pillow, 2015) are not necessary 
to elicit hypocrisy judgments. Additionally, Study 5 suggests that even inconsistency itself may 
be unnecessary to elicit hypocrisy judgments (cf. Monin & Merritt, 2012). On the other hand, 
several instances of hypocrisy fell beyond the scope of our studies. For example, our results do 
not directly address the question of whether people judge inconsistency as less hypocritical when 
it results from “weakness of will,” as in the case of an anti-drug crusader who fails to kick his 
private heroin addiction (Szabados & Soifer, 2004). The undeserved-benefits perspective would 
predict minimal perceptions of hypocrisy if people perceived the crusading addict as wracked 
with guilt, though this was not a focus of our studies. Similarly, we cannot address the question 
of whether transgressing one value in order to uphold another value would count as hypocrisy to 
laypeople (Alicke et al., 2013; Graham et al., 2015), although again the moral benefits 
perspective predicts the answer depends on the attributions people make about how the actor 
feels about the transgression. Last, appearing virtuous and feeling virtuous may not be the only 
moral benefits that could trigger hypocrisy judgments; so could having the right to influence 
others to be more or less virtuous. For example, a student who tells peers to party but then 
secretly studies is probably seen as a hypocrite (Alicke et al., 2013) because he claims the benefit 
of trying to influence others without paying the cost of doing the same thing himself. Future 
work should test the predictions of the undeserved-benefits theory about when these and other 
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ambiguous cases of moral inconsistency count or do not count as hypocrisy in the eyes of lay 
people.  
Practical Implications 
Our research points to the practical question of how employees in “sin-industry” 
organizations are judged for their good deeds outside work. For example, how would people 
think about the volunteering and charitable contributions by any of the 1.7 million people 
working in the gambling industry (Pierceall, 2014), the 3.8 million in fast food (Samadi, 2013), 
or the 12 million in tobacco manufacturing (International Labour Organization, 2014)? Our 
theorizing and results suggest that the answer may depend on how audiences believe the 
individuals feel about themselves in light of their good deeds. Some audiences may be more 
likely to cast them as hypocrites to the extent that they believe individuals feel better than they 
deserve – for example, the individuals feel virtuous despite not doing enough good deeds, doing 
the “wrong” kinds of good deeds, or doing good deeds that have little positive impact.  
Conclusion 
Seven studies document a broader interpretation of hypocrisy than has been previously 
understood: Even do-gooders face moral condemnation as hypocrites if their private charity 
appears inconsistent with their public-facing identity. Together, these provide new evidence that 
the shadow of hypocrisy can extend even to those virtuous deeds if they seem to help individuals 
morally cleanse themselves. 
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Table 1. Summary of Predicted Tests. 
     
Effect Study 
Test Statistic 
(t or z)* 
p-value Cohen’s d 
Total effect of 
Condition on 
Hypocrisy Judgments 
1 3.93 <.001 .45 
2 3.13   .002 .50 
3 4.07 <.001 .37 
4 3.51   .001 .35 
5  6.28 <.001 .48 
S1 4.38 <.001 .46 
S2 4.50 <.001 .41 
Indirect effect of 
Condition on Praise 
through Hypocrisy 
 b 95% CI  
1 -.29 (.09) [-.44, -.15]  
2 -.12 (.04) [-.22, -.05]  
4 -.15 (.05) [-.24, -.07]  
5 -.16 (.02) [-.20, -.12]  
S1 -.17 (.04) [-.25, -.09]  
S2 -.18 (.04) [-.26, -.10]  
Indirect effect of 
Condition on 
Hypocrisy through 
Guilt 
4 .33 (.05) [.24, .43]  
S1 .20 (.04) [.13, .29]  
S2 .12 (.03) [.07, .18]  
Serial indirect effect of 
Condition on Praise 
through Guilt and 
Hypocrisy 
4 -.19 (.03) [-.26, -.13]  
S1 -.10 (.02) [-.14, -.06]  
S2 -.07 (.02) [-.11, -.04]  
Serial indirect effect of 
Condition on Praise 
through Undeserved 
Benefits and Hypocrisy 
5 -.12 (.01) [-.15, -.10] 
 
 
 
 
Note: Standard errors reported in parentheses. For clarity in this table, Study 5 comparisons 
depict the comparison of means between the successful moral cleansing (i.e., guilt-relief) 
condition and control condition. Because Supplementary Study S1 included two measures of 
praise (hypocrisy of work and of charitable behavior), we report the measure about hypocrisy 
judgments for the target’s charitable behaviors. *The test statistic is z in Study 3 because our 
analysis was a mixed model, and t in all other studies. 
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Table 2. Means and Standard Deviations of Focal Measures, Studies 1-4, S1-S2.  
 
 Condition Total Effect of Condition 
Measure Study 
Inconsistent 
Virtue 
Unrelated 
Virtue1 
Test 
Statistic 
(t or z)2 
p-value Cohen’s d 
Hypocrisy 
1 5.23 (1.42) 4.62 (1.31) 3.93 <.001 0.45 
2 3.64 (1.16) 3.08 (1.06) 3.13 .002 0.50 
3 3.76 (1.40) 3.23 (1.41) 4.07 <.001 0.37 
4 3.86 (1.62) 3.30 (1.60) 3.51 .001 0.35 
S1 3.14 (1.61) 2.43 (1.45) 4.38 <.001 0.46 
S2 3.68 (1.52) 3.07 (1.43) 4.50 <.001 0.41 
       
Perceived 
Guilt 
4 4.78 (1.57) 3.48 (1.73) 7.95 <.001 0.79 
S1 4.72 (1.62) 3.47 (1.61) 7.40 <.001 0.78 
S2 5.02 (1.43) 4.25 (1.71) 5.37 <.001 0.49 
       
Praise 
1 3.10 (1.04) 2.52 (0.92) 5.18 <.001 –0.592 
2 5.10 (1.00) 5.46 (0.71) 2.57 .01 0.41 
4 5.18 (1.24) 5.39 (1.17) 1.77 .077 0.18 
S1 5.37 (1.14) 5.58 (1.07) 1.72 .087 0.18 
S2 5.08 (1.18) 5.21 (1.08) 1.28 .202 0.11 
 
Note: Standard Deviations reported in parentheses.  
 
1 In Study 1, this condition was a no-virtue control condition. The control condition provided no 
information about the target person’s private virtues; participants only judged him based on his 
less-virtuous public persona. In all other studies, the control was an “unrelated virtue” condition 
in which the target person performed private virtues that were unrelated to his less-virtuous 
public work. 
 
2 The test statistic is z in Study 3 because our analysis was a mixed model, and t in all other 
studies. 
 
3 The direction of Study 1’s effect is different than the other studies’ effect because Study 1 used 
a different control condition. See note 1 to this table. 
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Table 3. Means and Standard Deviations of Focal Measures, Study 5.  
 
 Condition 
Measure Guilt-Relief Guilt-Persists Control 
Hypocrisy 5.33a (1.19) 4.48b (1.14) 4.76c (1.18) 
Guilt (Manipulation Check) 2.18a (1.05) 5.09b (1.09) 2.38c (0.91) 
Feels Better Than He Deserves 6.12a (1.09) 3.36b (1.48) 5.28c (1.17) 
Praise 2.53a (1.12) 3.37b (1.12) 3.21b (1.25) 
 
Note: Standard Deviations reported in parentheses. Study 5 means with different superscripts 
indicate significantly different means.  
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Figure 1. Hypocrisy judgments mediate the relationship between condition and praise, Study 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Values are unstandardized path coefficients. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. The indirect 
effect of condition on praise was significantly mediated by hypocrisy as indicated by the bias-
corrected bootstrapped 95% CI around the indirect effect that did not include 0, b = -.29, SE = 
.09, [-.44, -.15], using 5,000 resamples. 
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Figure 2. Perceptions of hypocrisy mediate the relationship between condition (inconsistent- vs 
unrelated-virtue) and praise, Study 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Values are unstandardized path coefficients. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. The indirect 
effect of condition on praise was significantly mediated by hypocrisy as indicated by the bias-
corrected bootstrapped 95% CI around the indirect effect that did not include 0, b = -.12, SE = 
.04, [-.22, -.05], using 5,000 resamples. Robustness checks reported in the Online Supplement 
show that this effect remains significant even when controlling for alternative indirect effects 
through perceptions of harm to the organization. 
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Figure 3. Serial mediation results show the significant indirect path from condition to 
perceptions of guilt, hypocrisy, and praise, in Study 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Values are unstandardized path coefficients. Standard errors reported in parenthesis. †p < 
.10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. For clarity, alternative non-significant indirect effects 
among guilt, hypocrisy, and praise are not depicted in this figure. The bold lines show the 
significant serial indirect effect, b = -.19, SE = .03, bias-corrected 95% CI [-.26, -.13].  
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Figure 4. Serial mediation results show the significant indirect path from condition to 
perceptions of undeserved guilt-reduction, hypocrisy, and praise, in Study 5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Values are unstandardized path coefficients. Standard errors reported in parenthesis. *p < 
.05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. For clarity, like Figure 3, this figure does not depict alternative non-
significant alternative indirect effects among perceptions that he feels better than he deserves, 
hypocrisy, and praise. The bold lines show the significant serial indirect effect, b = -.12, SE = 
.01, bias-corrected 95% CI [-.15, -.10].  
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Figure 5. Meta-Analysis of the Effect of Inconsistency on Hypocrisy 
 
 
 
 
Note. Studies S1 and S2 are the two supplemental studies reported in the Online Supplement. 
The larger the effect size, the greater the tendency to perceive more hypocrisy in the 
inconsistent-virtue condition than in the unrelated-virtue condition. The size of the gray square is 
proportional to the sample size. CI = confidence interval. The analysis omits Studies 1 and 5 
because they did not include a separate unrelated-virtue condition. 
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Figure 6. Meta-Analysis of Effect of Inconsistency on Praise 
 
 
 
 
Note. Studies S1 and S2 are the two supplemental studies reported in the Online Supplement. 
The larger the effect size, the greater the tendency to express less praise in the inconsistent-virtue 
condition than in the unrelated-virtue condition. The size of the gray square is proportional to the 
sample size. CI = confidence interval. The analysis omits Study 3 because it did not assess 
praise, and Studies 1 and 5 because they did not include a separate unrelated-virtue condition. 
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